

German Ambassador's Revelations

The Most Sensational of War Documents, Proving
that the War was Deliberately Contrived

by Berlin

The Guilt of Germany

For the War of German Aggression

Prince Karl Lichnowsky's Memorandum

Being the Story of His Ambassadorship at London
from 1912 to 1914


Also

Foreign Secretary von Jagow's Reply

Prince Lichnowsky fixes *the personal responsibility of the Kaiser*, and shows how he was responsible for the Serbian Ultimatum and other Hunnish War aims. The pretence that Great Britain caused or desired the War, or that it was forced upon a pacific Kaiser by the Russian mobilisation, are alike killed stone-dead by this astounding indictment.

The Memorandum was not written for publication—it was only meant for the secret archives of the ex-Ambassador's family. Its publication is due to the act of a kinsman of Prince Lichnowsky who had served with distinction in the German Army, but who has since abandoned a military career.

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
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PRINCE KARL LICHNOWSKY.

The Guilt of Germany

For the War of German Aggression

Prince Karl Lichnowsky's Memorandum

Being the Story of His Ambassadorship at
London from 1912 to August, 1914

Together with
Foreign Minister Von Jagow's
Reply

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PRINCE LICHNOWSKY'S PROPHECY

“And what result have we to expect from the struggle of people? The United States of Africa will be British, like the United States of America, Australia, and Oceania; and the Latin States of Europe, as I said years ago, will fall into the same relationship to the United Kingdom as the Latin sisters of America to the United States. They will be dominated by the Anglo-Saxon; France, exhausted by the war, will link herself still more closely to Great Britain. In the long run, Spain also will not resist.

“In Asia, the Russians and the Japanese will expand with their limitations and their customs, and the South will remain to the British.

“The world will belong to the Anglo-Saxon, the Russian, and the Japanese, and the German will remain alone with Austria and Hungary. His sphere of power will be that of thought and of trade, not that of the bureaucrats and the soldiers. The German appeared too late, and the world war has destroyed the last possibility of catching up the lost ground, of founding a Colonial Empire.”

The Guilt of Germany

THE LONDON EMBASSY

KUCHELNA, 16 August, 1916.

BARON MARSCHALL died in September, 1912, having held his post in London for a few months only. His appointment, which was due mainly to his age and the plotting of a younger man to get to London, was one of the many mistakes made by our Foreign Office. In spite of his imposing personality and great reputation, he was too old and tired to be able to adapt himself to a purely foreign and Anglo-Saxon milieu. He was more of a bureaucrat and a lawyer than a diplomat or statesman. He set to work to convince Englishmen of the harmless character of our fleet, and

naturally succeeded in strengthening an entirely opposite impression.

To my great surprise I was offered the post in October. After many years' work I had withdrawn to the country, as no suitable post had been found for me, and I spent my time on my farm and in my garden, on horseback and in the fields, but I read industriously and published occasional political articles. Thus eight years passed, and thirteen since I had left Vienna as Ambassador. That was actually my last political employment. I do not know to whom my appointment in London was due. At all events, not to his Majesty, as I did not belong to his immediate set, although he was always gracious to me. I know by experience that his candidates were frequently successfully opposed. As a matter of fact, Herr von Kiderlen-Wächter wanted to send Baron von Stumm to London. He met me at once with undisguised ill-will, and tried to frighten me by rudeness. Herr

von Bethmann-Hollweg was amiable to me, and had visited me shortly before at Grätz. I am, therefore, inclined to think that they settled on me as no other candidate was available. Had Baron von Marschall not died, it is unlikely that I should have been dug out any more than in previous years. The moment was obviously favourable for an attempt to come to a better understanding with England.

THE MOROCCO QUESTION

Our obscure policy in Morocco had repeatedly caused distrust of our peaceful intention, or, at least, had raised doubts as to whether we knew what we wanted or whether our intention was to keep Europe in a state of suspense and, on occasion, to humiliate the French. An Austrian colleague, who was a long time in Paris, said to me: 'The French had begun to forget *la revanche*. You have regularly reminded

them of it by tramping on their toes." After we had declined Delcassé's offer to come to an agreement regarding Morocco, and then solemnly declared that we had no political interest there—an attitude which agreed with Bismarckian political conditions—we suddenly discovered in Abdul Aziz a Kruger Number Two. To him also, as to the Boers, we promised the protection of the mighty German Empire, and with the same result. Both manifestations concluded as they were bound to conclude, with a retraction, if we were not prepared to start a world-war. The pitiable conference of Algeciras could alter nothing, and still less cause Delcassé's fall. Our attitude furthered the Russo-Japanese and Russo-British rapprochement. In face of "the German peril" all other considerations faded into the background. The possibility of another Franco-German war had been patent, and, as had not been the case in 1870, such a war could not leave out Russia or England.

WORTHLESS AGREEMENTS

The valuelessness of the Triple Alliance had already been demonstrated at Algeciras, and, immediately afterward, the equal worthlessness of the agreements made there when the Sultanate fell to pieces, which was, of course, unavoidable. Meanwhile, the belief was spreading among the Russian people that our foreign policy was weak and was breaking down under "encirclement," and that cowardly surrender followed on haughty gestures. It is to the credit of von Kiderlen-Wächter, though otherwise overrated as a statesman, that he cleared up the Moroccan situation and adapted himself to circumstances which could not be altered. Whether the world had to be upset by the Agadir coup is a question I do not touch. This event was hailed with joy in Germany, but in England caused all the more uneasiness in that the British Government waited in vain for three weeks for a statement of our

intentions. Mr. Lloyd George's Mansion House speech, intended to warn us, was a consequence. Before Delcassé's fall and before the Algeciras conference we could have obtained harbours and bases on the West Coast, but that was no longer possible.

When I came to London, in November, 1912, people had become easier about the question of Morocco, especially since an agreement had been reached with France and Berlin. Lord Haldane's mission had failed, it is true, as we demanded promises of neutrality instead of contenting ourselves with a treaty which would insure us against a British attack or any attack with British support. Sir Edward Grey had not, meanwhile, given up the idea of coming to an understanding with us, and made such an attempt first on economic and colonial grounds. Through the agency of that qualified and expert Councillor of Embassy, von Kühlmann, an exchange of opinions had taken place with regard to the renewal

of the Portuguese colonial treaty and the Bagdad railway, which thus carried out the unexpected aim of dividing into spheres of interest both the above-mentioned colonies and Asia Minor. The British statesman, old points in dispute both with France and Russia having been settled, wished to come to a similar agreement with us. His intention was not to isolate us but to make us in so far as possible partners in a working concern. Just as he had succeeded in bridging Franco-British and Russo-British difficulties, so he wished as far as possible to remove German-British difficulties, and by a network of treaties—which would finally include an agreement on the miserable fleet question—to secure the peace of the world, as our earlier policy had lent itself to a co-operation with the Entente, which contained a mutual assurance against the danger of war. _

GREY'S DESIRES

This was Sir Edward Grey's program in his own words: "Without infringing on the existing friendly relations with France and Russia, which in themselves contained no aggressive elements, and no binding obligations for England; to seek to achieve a more friendly rapprochement with Germany, and to bring the two groups nearer together."

In England, as with us, there were two opinions, that of the optimists, who believed in an understanding, and that of the pessimists, who considered war inevitable sooner or later. Among the former were Mr. Asquith, Sir Edward Grey, Lord Haldane, and most of the Ministers in the Radical Cabinet, as well as leading Liberal organs, such as *The Westminster Gazette*, *The Manchester Guardian*, and *The Daily Chronicle*. To the pessimists belong especially Conservative politicians like Mr.

Balfour, who repeatedly made his meaning clear to me; leading soldiers such as Lord Roberts, who insisted on the necessity of conscription, and on "the writing on the wall"; and, further, the Northcliffe press, and that leading English journalist, Mr. Garvin of *The Observer*. During my term of office they abstained from all attacks and took up, personally and politically, a friendly attitude. Our naval policy and our attitude in the years 1905, 1908, and 1911 had, nevertheless, caused them to think that it might one day come to war. Just as with us, the former are now dubbed shortsighted and simple-minded, while the latter are regarded as the true prophets.

BALKAN QUESTIONS

The first Balkan war led to the collapse of Turkey and with it the defeat of our policy, which had been identified with Turkey for many years. Since the salva-

tion of Turkey in Europe was no longer feasible, only two possibilities for settling the question remained. Either we declared we had no longer any interest in the definition of boundaries in the Balkan Peninsula, and left the settlement of the question to the Balkan peoples themselves, or we supported our allies and carried out a Triple Alliance policy in the East, thereby giving up the rôle of mediator.

I urged the former course from the beginning, but the German Foreign Office very much preferred the latter. The chief question was Albania. Our allies desired the establishment of an independent State of Albania, as Austria would not allow Serbia to reach the Adriatic, and Italy did not wish the Greeks to reach Valona or even the territory north of Corfu. On the other hand, Russia, as is known, favoured Serbian, and France Greek, desires. My advice was now to consider the question as outside the alliance, and to support

neither Austrian nor Italian wishes. Without our support the establishment of Albania, whose incapability of existence might have been foreseen, was an impossibility. Serbia would have pushed forward to the coast; then the present world-war would have been avoided. France and Italy would have remained definitely divided as to Greece, and the Italians, had they not wished to fight France alone, would have been obliged to consent to the expansion of Greece to the district north of Durazzo. The greater part of civilized Albania is Greek. The southern towns are entirely Greek, and, at the time of the Conference of Ambassadors, deputations from the larger towns came to London to carry through the annexation to Greece.

In Greece today whole groups are Albanian, and the so-called Greek national dress is of Albanian origin. The amalgamation of the preponderating Orthodox and Islamic Albanians with the Greek State was, there-

fore, the best solution and the most natural, if one leaves out of account Scutari and the northern part of Serbia and Montenegro. His Majesty was also in favour of this solution on dynastic grounds. When I encouraged the monarch by letter to this effect, I received violent reproaches from the Chancellor for supporting Austria's opponents, and he forbade all such interference in the future, and even direct correspondence. We had eventually, however, to abandon the tradition of carrying out the Triple Alliance policy in the East and to acknowledge our mistake, which consisted in identifying ourselves with the Turks in the south and the Austro-Magyars in the north; for the continuance of that policy, which we began at the Congress in Berlin and subsequently carried on zealously was bound in time, should the necessary skill in conducting it fail, to lead to a collision with Russia and a world-war.

TURKEY, RUSSIA, AND ITALY

Instead of uniting with Russia on the basis of the independence of the Sultan, whom the Russians also did not wish to drive out of Constantinople, and confining ourselves to economic interests in the East, whilst at the same time refraining from all military and political interference and being satisfied with a division of Asia Minor into spheres of interest, the goal of our political ambition was to dominate in the Bosphorus. In Russia, therefore, the opinion arose that the way to Constantinople and to the Mediterranean lay through Berlin. Instead of encouraging a powerful development in the Balkan States, which were once free and are very different from the Russians, of which fact we have already had experience, we placed ourselves on the side of the Turkish and Magyar oppressors. The dire mistake of our Triple Alliance and our Eastern policies, which drove Russia

—our natural friend and best neighbour—into the arms of France and England, and kept her from her policy of Asiatic expansion, was the more evident, as a Franco-Russian attack, the only hypothesis justifying a Triple Alliance policy, had to be eliminated from our calculations.

As to the value of the alliance with Italy, one word only. Italy needs our money and our tourists after the war, with or without our alliance. That our alliance would go by the board in the event of war was to be foreseen. The alliance consequently was worthless.

AUSTRIA'S POSITION

Austria, however, needed our protection both in war and peace, and had no other *point d'appui*. This dependence on us is based on political, national, and economic grounds, and is all the greater in proportion to the intimacy of our relations

with Russia. This was proved in the Bosnian crisis. Since Count Beust, no Vienna Minister had been so self-conscious with us as Count Aehrenthal was during the last years of his life. Under the influence of a properly conducted German policy which would keep us in touch with Russia, Austria-Hungary is our vassal, and is tied to us even without an alliance and without reciprocal services; under the influence of a misguided policy, however, we are tied to Austria-Hungary. An alliance would therefore be purposeless.

I know Austria far too well not to know that a return to the policy of Count Felix Schwarzenberg or to that of Count Moritz Esterhazy was unthinkable. Little as the Slavs living there love us, they wish just as little for a return to the German Kaiserdom, even with a Habsburg-Lorraine at its head. They are striving for an internal Austrian Federation on a national basis, a condition which is even less likely of

realization within the German Empire than under the Double Eagle. Austro-Germans look on Berlin as the centre of German power and Kultur, and they know that Austria can never be a leading power. They desire as close a connection as possible with the empire, but not to the extent of an anti-German policy.

Since the seventies the conditions have changed fundamentally in Austria, and also perhaps in Bavaria. Just as here a return to Pangerman particularism and the old Bavarian policy is not to be feared, so there a revival of the policy of Prince Kaunitz and Prince Schwarzenberg is not to be contemplated. But by a constitutional union with Austria, which even without Galicia and Dalmatia is inhabited at least to the extent of one-half by non-Germans, our interests would suffer; whilst, on the other hand, by the subordination of our policy to the point of view of Vienna and Budapest,

we should have to *épouser les querelles de l'Autriche*.

BALKAN QUARRELS

We therefore had no need to heed the desires of our allies. They were not only unnecessary but dangerous, inasmuch as they would lead to a collision with Russia if we looked at Eastern questions through Austrian eyes. The transformation of our alliance with its single original purpose into a complete alliance, involving a complexity of common interests, was calculated to call forth the very state of things which the constitutional negotiations were designed to prevent, namely, war. Such a policy of alliances would, moreover, entail the loss of the sympathies of the young, strong, and growing communities in the Balkan Peninsula, which were ready to turn to us and open their market to us. The contrast between dynastic and democratic ideas had to be given clear expression, and, as usual,

we stood on the wrong side. King Carol told one of our representatives that he had made an alliance with us on condition that we retained control of affairs, but that if that control passed to Austria it would entirely change the basis of affairs, and under those conditions he could no longer participate. Matters stood in the same position in Serbia, where against our own economic interests we were supporting an Austrian policy of strangulation.

We had always backed horses which, it was evident, would lose, such as Kruger, Abdul Aziz, Abdul Hamid, Wilhelm of Wied, and finally—and this was the most miserable mistake of all—Count Berchtold.

Shortly after my arrival in London, in 1912, Sir Edward Grey proposed an informal exchange of views in order to prevent a European war developing out of the Balkan War, since, at the outbreak of that war, we had unfortunately declined the proposal of the French Government to join in a

declaration of disinterestedness and impartiality on the part of the Powers. The British statesman maintained from the beginning that England had no interest in Albania, and would, therefore, not go to war on the subject. In his rôle of "honest broker" he would confine his efforts to mediation and an attempt to smooth away difficulties between the two groups. He, therefore, by no means placed himself on the side of the Entente Powers, and during the negotiations, which lasted about eight months, he lent his good will and powerful influence toward the establishment of an understanding. Instead of adopting the English point of view we accepted that dictated to us by Vienna. Count Mensdorff led the Triple Alliance in London and I was his second.

GREY ALWAYS CONCILIATORY

My duty was to support his proposals. The clever and experienced Count Szogyenyi

was at the helm in Berlin. His refrain was *casus fœderis*, and when once I dared to doubt the justice of this phrase I was seriously warned against Austrophobism. Referring to my father, it was even said that I had inherited it. On every point, including Albania, the Serbian harbours in the Adriatic, Scutari, and in the definition of the Albanian frontiers, we were on the side of Austria and Italy, while Sir Edward Grey hardly ever took the French or Russian point of view. On the contrary, he nearly always took our part in order to give no pretext for war—which was afterward brought about by a dead Archduke. It was with his help that King Nicholas was induced to leave Scutari. Otherwise there would have been war over this matter, as we should never have dared to ask "our allies" to make concessions.

Sir Edward Grey conducted the negotiations with care, calm, and tact. When a question threatened to become involved he

proposed a formula which met the case and always secured consent. He acquired the full confidence of all the representatives.

AUSTRIA AND RUSSIA

Once again we had successfully withstood one of the many threats against the strength characterizing our policy. Russia had been obliged to give way to us all along the line, as she never got an opportunity to advance Serbian wishes. Albania was set up as an Austrian vassal State, and Serbia was driven away from the sea. The conference was thus a fresh humiliation for Russia.

As in 1878 and 1908, we had opposed the Russian program without German interests being brought into play. Bismarck had to minimize the mistake of the Congress by a secret treaty, and his attitude in the Battenberg question—the downward incline being taken by us in the Bosnian question

—was followed up in London, and was not given up, with the result that it led to the abyss.

The dissatisfaction then prevalent in Russia was given vent to during the London Conference by an attack in the Russian press on my Russian colleague and on Russian diplomacy.

His German origin and Catholic faith, his reputation as a friend of Germany, and the accident that he was related both to Count Mensdorff and to myself were all made use of by dissatisfied parties. Although not a particularly important personality, Count Benckendorff possessed many qualities of a good diplomat—tact, worldly knowledge, experience, an agreeable personality, and a natural eye for men and things. He sought always to avoid provocative attitudes, and was supported by the attitude of England and France.

I once said, "The feeling in Russia is very anti-German." He replied, "There

are also many strong influential pro-German circles there. But the people generally are anti-Austrian."

It only remains to be added that our exaggerated Austrophilism is not exactly likely to break up the Entente and turn Russia's attention to her Asiatic interests.

PRE-WAR DIPLOMACY

The following extracts, which had formerly been suppressed by the Swedish Government, appeared in the "Politiken" of Stockholm on March 26th:

At the same time (1913) the Balkan Conference met in London, and I had the opportunity of meeting the leading men of the Balkan States. The most important personage among them was M. Venizelos. He was anything but anti-German, and particularly prized the Order of the Red Eagle, which he even wore at the French Embassy. With his winning amiability and *savoir faire* he could always win sympathy.

Next to him a great rôle was played by Daneff, the then Bulgarian Prime Minister and Count Berchtold's confidant. He gave

the impression of being a capable and energetic man, and even the influence of his friends at Vienna and Budapest, at which he sometimes laughed, was attributable to the fact that he had let himself be drawn into the second Balkan war and had declined Russian intervention.

M. Take Jonescu was often in London, too, and visited me regularly. I had known him since the time when I was Secretary at Bucharest. He was also one of Herr von Kiderlen-Wächter's friends. His aim in London was to secure concessions for Rumania by negotiations with M. Daneff. In this he was supported by the most capable Rumanian Minister, M. Misu. That these negotiations were stranded by the Bulgarian opposition is known. Count Berchtold—and naturally we with him—was entirely on the side of Bulgaria; otherwise we should have succeeded by pressure on M. Daneff in obtaining the desired satisfaction for the Rumanians and have bound Rumania

to us, as she was by Austria's attitude in the second Balkan war, while afterward she was estranged from the Central Powers.

Bulgaria's defeat in the second Balkan war and Serbia's victory, as well as the Rumanian advance, naturally constituted a reproach to Austria. The idea of equalizing this by military intervention in Serbia seems to have gained ground rapidly in Vienna. This is proved by the Italian disclosure, and it may be presumed that the Marquis di San Giuliano, who described the plan as a *pericolossissima avventura* (an extremely risky adventure), saved us from a European war as far back as the summer of 1912. Intimate as Russo-Italian relations were, the aspiration of Vienna must have been known in St. Petersburg. In any event, M. Take Jonescu told me that M. Sazonoff had said in Constanza that an attack on Serbia on the part of Austria meant war with Russia.

In the spring of 1914 one of my Secre-

taries, on returning from leave in Vienna, said that Herr von Tschirschky (German Ambassador in Vienna) had declared that war must soon come. But as I was always kept in the dark regarding important things, I considered his pessimism unfounded.

Ever since the peace of Bucharest it seems to have been the opinion in Vienna that the revision of this treaty should be undertaken independently, and only a favourable opportunity was awaited. The statesmen in Vienna and Bucharest could naturally count upon our support. This they knew, for already they had been reproached several times for their slackness. Berlin even insisted on the "rehabilitation" of Austria.

ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS

When I returned to London in December, 1913, after a long holiday, the Liman von Sanders question had led to our rela-

tions with Russia becoming acute. Sir Edward Grey called my attention with some uneasiness to the consequent unrest in St. Petersburg, saying: "I have never seen them so excited." Berlin instructed me to beg the Minister to urge calm in St. Petersburg and help to solve the difficulty. Sir Edward was quite willing, and his intervention contributed not inconsiderably to smoothing matters over. My good relations with Sir Edward and his great influence in St. Petersburg served in a like manner on several occasions when it was a question of carrying through something of which our representative there was completely incapable.

During the critical days of July, 1914, Sir Edward said to me: "If ever you want something done in St. Petersburg you come to me regularly, but if ever I appeal for your influence in Vienna you refuse your support." The good and dependable relations I was fortunate in making not only

in society and among influential people, such as Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Asquith, but also with others at public dinners, had brought about a noticeable improvement in our relations with England. Sir Edward devoted himself honestly to further this rapprochement, and his intentions were especially noticeable in two questions—the Colonial Treaty and the treaty regarding the Bagdad Railway.

AFRICAN AGREEMENT

The following extracts, which deal with the African treaty which was negotiated while Prince Lichnowsky was Ambassador at London, are taken from the "Muenchener Neueste Nachrichten":

In the year 1898 a secret treaty had been signed by Count Hatzfeldt [then German Ambassador in London] and Mr. Balfour, which divided the Portuguese colonies in Africa into economic-political spheres of interest between us and England. As the Portuguese Government possessed neither the power nor the means to open up or adequately to administer its extensive possessions, the Portuguese Government had already at an earlier date thought of selling these possessions and thereby put-

ting their finances in order. Between us and England an agreement had been reached which defined the interests of the two parties and which was of all the greater value because Portugal, as is well known, is completely dependent upon England. This treaty was no doubt to secure outwardly the integrity and independence of the Portuguese Empire, and it only expressed the intention of giving financial and economic assistance to the Portuguese. Consequently it did not, according to the text, conflict with the old Anglo-Portuguese alliance, dating from the fifteenth century, which was last renewed under Charles II. and which guaranteed the territories of the two parties. Nevertheless, at the instance of the Marquis Soveral, who presumably was not ignorant of the Anglo-German agreement, a new treaty—the so-called Windsor treaty—which confirmed the old agreements, was concluded in 1899 between England and Portugal.

ENGLAND'S GENEROUS ATTITUDE

The object of the negotiations between us and England, which had begun before my arrival, was to alter and amend our treaty of 1898, which contained many impossible features—for example, with regard to the geographical delimitation. Thanks to the conciliatory attitude of the British Government, I succeeded in giving to the new treaty a form which entirely accorded with our wishes and interests. All Angola, as far as the 20th degree of longitude, was allotted to us, so that we reached the Congo territory from the south. Moreover, the valuable islands of San Thomé and Príncipe, which lie north of the equator, and therefore really belonged to the French sphere of interest, were allotted to us—a fact which caused my French colleague to make lively, although vain, representations. Further, we obtained the northern part of Mozambique; the frontier was formed

by the Likungo. The British Government showed the utmost readiness to meet our interests and wishes. Sir Edward Grey intended to prove his good will to us, but he also desired to promote our colonial development, because England hoped to divert Germany's development of strength from the North Sea and Western Europe to the world-sea and Africa. "We don't want to grudge Germany her colonial development," a member of the Cabinet said to me.

Originally, at the British suggestion, the Congo State was to be included in the treaty, which would have given us a right of pre-emption and a possibility of economic penetration in the Congo State. But we refused this offer, out of alleged respect for Belgian sensibilities! Perhaps the idea was to economize our successes? With regard also to the practical realization of the real but unexpressed object of the treaty—the actual partition at a later date of the Portuguese colonial possessions—the new for-

mulation showed considerable advantages and progress as compared with the old. Thus the treaty contemplated circumstances which would enable us to enter the territories ascribed to us, for the protection of our interests. These conditional clauses were so wide that it was really left to us to decide when really "vital" interests were concerned, so that, in view of the complete dependence of Portugal upon England, we merely needed to go on cultivating our relations with England in order, later on, with English assent, to realize our mutual intentions.

The sincerity of the English Government in its effort to respect our rights was proved by the fact that Sir Edward Grey, before ever the treaty was completed or signed, called our attention to English men of business who were seeking opportunities to invest capital in the territories allotted to us by the new treaty, and who desired British support. In doing so he remarked

that the undertakings in question belonged to our sphere of interest.

WILHELMSTRASSE INTRIGUES

The treaty was practically complete at the time of the King's visit to Berlin in May, 1913. A conversation then took place in Berlin under the Presidency of the Imperial Chancellor (Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg), in which I took part, and at which special wishes were laid down. On my return to London I succeeded, with the help of my Counsellor of Embassy, von Kühlmann, who was working upon the details of the treaty with Mr. Parker, in putting through our last proposals also. It was possible for the whole treaty to be initialled by Sir Edward Grey and myself in August, 1913, before I went on leave. Now, however, new difficulties were to arise, which prevented the signature, and it was only a year later, shortly before the out-

break of war, that I was able to obtain authorization for the final settlement. Signature, however, never took place.

Sir Edward Grey was willing to sign only if the treaty was published, together with the two treaties of 1898 and 1899; England has no other secret treaties, and it is contrary to her existing principles that she should conceal binding agreements. He said, however, that he was ready to take account of our wishes concerning the time and manner of publication, provided that publication took place within one year, at latest, after the signature. In the [Berlin] Foreign Office, however, where my London successes aroused increasing dissatisfaction, and where an influential personage [the reference is apparently to Herr von Stumm], who played the part of Herr von Holstein, was claiming the London Embassy for himself, it was stated that the publication would imperil our interests in the colonies, because the Portuguese would

show their gratitude by giving us no more concessions. The accuracy of this excuse is illuminated by the fact that the old treaty was most probably just as much long known to the Portuguese as our new agreements must have been, in view of the intimacy of relations between Portugal and England; it was illuminated also by the fact that, in view of the influence which England possesses at Lisbon, the Portuguese Government is completely powerless in face of an Anglo-German understanding.

A DISASTROUS MISTAKE

Consequently it was necessary to find another excuse for wrecking the treaty. It was said that the publication of the Windsor Treaty, which was concluded in the time of Prince Hohenlohe, and which was merely a renewal of the treaty of Charles II., which had never lapsed, might imperil the position of Herr von Bethmann-

Hollweg, as being a proof of British hypocrisy and perfidy! On this I pointed out that the preamble to our treaties said exactly the same thing as the Windsor Treaty and other similar treaties—namely, that we desired to protect the sovereign rights of Portugal and the integrity of its possessions! In spite of repeated conversations with Sir Edward Grey, in which the Minister made ever fresh proposals concerning publication, the [Berlin] Foreign Office remained obstinate, and finally agreed with Sir Edward Goschen [British Ambassador in Berlin] that everything should remain as it was before. So the treaty, which gave us extraordinary advantages, the result of more than one year's work, had collapsed because it would have been a public success for me. When in the spring of 1914 I happened, at a dinner in the Embassy, at which Mr. Harcourt [then Colonial Secretary] was present, to mention the matter, the Colonial Secretary said

that he was embarrassed and did not know how to behave. He said that the present state of affairs was intolerable, because he [Mr. Harcourt] wanted to respect our rights, but, on the other hand, was in doubt as to whether he should follow the old treaty or the new. He said that it was therefore extremely desirable to clear matters up, and to bring to a conclusion an affair which had been hanging on for so long.

When I reported to this effect, I received a rude and excited order, telling me to refrain from any further interference in the matter.

I now regret that I did not go to Berlin in order to offer his Majesty my resignation, and that I still did not lose my belief in the possibility of an agreement between me and the leading [German] personages. That was a disastrous mistake, which was to be tragically avenged some months later.

Slight though was the extent to which I then still possessed the good-will of

the Imperial Chancellor—because he feared that I was aiming at his office—I must do him the justice to say that at the end of June, 1914, in our last conversation before the outbreak of war, he gave his consent to the signature and publication. Nevertheless, it required further repeated suggestions on my part, which were supported by Dr. Solf [German Colonial Secretary], in order at last to obtain official consent at the end of July. Then the Serbian crisis was already threatening the peace of Europe, and so the completion of the treaty had to be postponed. The treaty is now one of the victims of the war.

BAGDAD RAILWAY TREATY

The following extracts were published in the "Politiken" of Stockholm on March 26th:

At the same time, while the African agreement was under discussion, I was negotiating, with the effective co-operation of Herr von Kühlmann, the so-called Bagdad Railway Treaty. This aimed, in fact, at the division of Asia Minor into spheres of interest, although this expression was carefully avoided in consideration of the Sultan's rights. Sir Edward Grey declared repeatedly that there was no agreement between England and France aiming at a division of Asia Minor.

In the presence of the Turkish representative, Hakki Pasha, all economic questions in connection with the German treaty were settled mainly in accordance with the

wishes of the Ottoman Bank. The greatest concession Sir Edward Grey made me personally was the continuation of the line to Basra. We had not insisted on this terminus in order to establish connection with Alexandretta. Hitherto Bagdad had been the terminus of the line. The shipping on the Shat-el-Arab was to be in the hands of an international commission. We also obtained a share in the harbour works at Basra, and even acquired shipping rights on the Tigris, hitherto the monopoly of the firm of Lynch.

By this treaty the whole of Mesopotamia up to Basra became our zone of interest, whereby the whole British rights, the question of shipping on the Tigris, and the Wilcox establishments were left untouched, as well as all the district of Bagdad and the Anatolian railways.

The British economic territories included the coasts of the Persian Gulf and the Smyrna-Aidin Railway, the French

Syria, and the Russian Armenia. Had both treaties been concluded and published, an agreement would have been reached with England which would have finally ended all doubt of the possibility of an Anglo-German co-operation.

GERMAN NAVAL DEVELOPMENT

Most difficult of all, there remained the question of the fleet. It was never quite rightly judged. The creation of a mighty fleet on the other shore of the North Sea and the simultaneous development of the Continent's most important military power into its most important naval power had at least to be recognized by England as uncomfortable. This presumably cannot be doubted. To maintain the necessary lead and not to become dependent, to preserve the supremacy of the sea, which Britain must have in order not to go down, she had to undertake preparations and

expenses which weighed heavily on the taxpayer. A threat against the British world position was made in that our policy allowed the possibility of warlike development to appear. This possibility was obviously near during the Morocco crisis and the Bosnian question.

People had become reconciled to our fleet in its definite strength. Obviously it was not welcome to the British and constituted one of the motives, but neither the only nor the most important motive, for England's joining hands with Russia and France. On account of our fleet alone, however, England would have drawn the sword as little as on account of our trade, which it is pretended called forth her jealousy and ultimately brought about war.

From the beginning I adopted the standpoint that in spite of the fleet it would be possible to come to a friendly understanding and rapprochement if we did not propose new votes of credit, and, above all,

if we carried out an indisputable peace policy. I also avoided all mention of the fleet, and between me and Sir Edward Grey the word was never uttered. Sir Edward Grey declared on one occasion at a Cabinet meeting: "The present German Ambassador has never mentioned the fleet to me."

UNDERSTANDING POSSIBLE

During my term of office the then First Lord, Mr. Churchill, raised the question of a so-called naval holiday, and proposed, for financial reasons as much as on account of the pacifist inclinations of his party, a one year's pause in armaments. Officially the suggestion was not supported by Sir Edward Grey. He never spoke of it to me, but Mr. Churchill spoke to me on repeated occasions.

I am convinced that his initiative was honest, cunning in general not being part of the Englishman's constitution. It would

have been a great success for Mr. Churchill to secure economies for the country and to lighten the burden of armament, which was weighing heavily on the people.

I maintain that it would have been difficult to support his intention. How about the workmen employed for this purpose? How about the technical personnel? Our naval program was settled, and it would be difficult to alter it. Nor, on the other hand, did we intend exceeding it. But he pointed out that the means spent on portentous armaments could equally be used for other purposes. I maintain that such expenditure would have benefited home industries.

I also succeeded, in conversation with Sir William Tyrrell, Sir Edward Grey's private secretary, in keeping away that subject without raising suspicion, although it came up in Parliament, and preventing the Government's proposal from being made. But it was Mr. Churchill's and the

Government's favourite idea that by supporting his initiative in the matter of large ships we should give proof of our goodwill and considerably strengthen and increase the tendency on the part of the Government to get in closer contact with us. But, as I have said, it was possible in spite of our fleet and without naval holidays to come to an understanding.

In that spirit I had carried out my mission from the beginning, and had even succeeded in realizing my program when the war broke out and destroyed everything.

Trade jealousy, so much talked about among us, rests on faulty judgment of circumstances. It is a fact that Germany's progress as a trading country after the War of 1870 and during the following decades threatened the interests of British trade circles, constituting a form of monopoly with its industry and export houses. But the growing interchange of merchandise with Germany, which was first on the list

of all European exporting countries, a fact I always referred to in my public speeches, had allowed the desire to mature to preserve good relations with England's best client and business friend, and had gradually suppressed all other thoughts and motives. The Englishman, as a matter of fact, adapts himself to circumstances and does not tilt against windmills. In commercial circles I found the greatest goodwill and desire to further our common economic interests.

In other circles I had a most amiable reception, and enjoyed the cordial goodwill of the Court, society, and the Government.

INFLUENCE OF THE CROWN

The King, very amiable and well meaning and possessed of sound understanding and common sense, was invariably well disposed toward me and desired honestly to facilitate my mission. In spite of the small

amount of power which the British Constitution gives the Crown, the King can, by virtue of his position, greatly influence the tone both of society and the Government. The Crown is the apex of society from which the tone emanates. Society, which is overwhelmingly Unionist, is largely occupied by ladies connected with politics. It is represented in the Lords and the Commons, consequently also in the Cabinet.

The Englishman either belongs to society or ought to belong to it. His aim is, and always will be, to be a distinguished man and a gentleman, and even men of modest origin, such as Mr. Asquith, prefer to be in society, with its elegant women.

British gentlemen of both parties enjoy the same education, go to the same colleges and university, and engage in the same sports—golf, cricket, lawn tennis, and polo. All have played cricket and football in their youth, all have the same habits, and all spend the week-end in the country. No

social cleavage divides the parties, only political cleavage. To some extent of late years the politicians in the two camps have avoided one another in society. Not even on the ground of a neutral mission could the two camps be amalgamated, for since the Home Rule and Veto bills the Unionists have despised the Radicals. A few months after my arrival the King and Queen dined with me, and Lord Londonderry left the house after dinner in order not to be with Sir Edward Grey. But there is no opposition from difference in caste and education as in France. There are not two worlds, but the same world, and their opinion of a foreigner is common and not without influence on his political standing, whether a Lansdowne or an Asquith is at the helm.

POLITICS AND SOCIETY

The difference of caste no longer exists in England since the time of the Stuarts

and since the Whig oligarchy (in contradistinction to the Tory county families) allowed the bourgeoisie in the towns to rise in society. There is greater difference in political opinions on constitutional or Church questions than on financial or political questions. Aristocrats who have joined the popular party, Radicals such as Grey, Churchill, Harcourt, and Crewe, are most hated by the Unionist aristocracy. None of these gentlemen have I ever met in great aristocratic houses, only in the houses of party friends.

We were received in London with open arms, and both parties outdid one another in amiability.

It would be a mistake to undervalue social connections in view of the close connection in England between society and politics, even though the majority of the upper ten thousand are in opposition to the Government. Between an Asquith and a Devonshire there is no such deep cleft as

between a Briand and a Duc de Doudeauville, for example. In times of political tension they do not foregather. They belong to two separate social groups, but are part of the same society, if on different levels, the centre of which is the Court. They have friends and habits in common, they are often related or connected. A phenomenon like Lloyd George, a man of the people, a small solicitor and a self-made man, is an exception. Even John Burns, a Socialist Labour leader and a self-taught man, seeks society relations. On the ground of a general striving to be considered gentlemen of social weight and position such men must not be undervalued.

In no place, consequently, is an envoy's social circle of greater consequence than in England. A hospitable house with friendly guests is worth more than the profoundest scientific knowledge, and a learned man of insignificant appearance and too small means would, in spite of all

his learning, acquire no influence. The Briton hates a bore and a pedant. He loves a good fellow.

SIR EDWARD GREY'S SOCIALISM

Sir Edward Grey's influence in all questions of foreign policy was almost unlimited. True, he used to say on important occasions: "I must lay that before the Cabinet"; but it is equally true that the latter invariably took his view. Although he did not know foreign countries and, with the exception of one short visit to Paris, had never left England, he was closely informed on all important questions, owing to many years' Parliamentary experience and natural grasp. He understood French without speaking it. Elected at an early age to Parliament, he began immediately to occupy himself with foreign affairs. Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the Foreign Office under Lord Rosebery, he became in 1906 Secre-

tary of State under Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, and filled the post for ten years.

Sprung from an old North of England family of landowners, from whom the statesman Earl Grey is also descended, he joined the left wing of his party and sympathized with the Socialists and pacifists. He can be called a Socialist in the ideal sense, for he applied his theories even in private life, which is characterized by great simplicity and unpretentiousness, although he is possessed of considerable means. All display is foreign to him. He had a small residence in London and never gave dinners, except officially, at the Foreign Office on the King's birthday. If, exceptionally, he asked a few guests to his house, it was to a simple dinner or luncheon in a small circle with parlour-maids for service. The week-ends he spent regularly in the country, like his colleagues, but not at large country-house parties. He lives mostly

in his cottage in the New Forest, taking long walks, and is passionately fond of nature and ornithology. Or he journeyed to his property in the north and tamed squirrels. In his youth he was a noted cricket and tennis player. His chief sport is now salmon and trout fishing in the Scotch lakes with Lord Glenconner, Mr. Asquith's brother-in-law. Once, when spending his week-ends with Lord Glenconner, he came thirty miles on a bicycle and returned in the same way. His simple upright manner insured him the esteem even of his opponents, who were more easily to be found in home than in foreign political circles.

Lies and intrigue were foreign to his nature. His wife, whom he loved and from whom he was never separated, died as the result of an accident to the carriage driven by him. As is known, one brother was killed by a lion.

Wordsworth was his favourite poet, and

he could quote him by the hour. His British calm did not lack a sense of humour. When breakfasting with us and the children and he heard their German conversation, he would say, "I cannot help admiring the way they talk German," and laughed at his joke. This is the man who was called "the Liar Grey" and the "originator of the world-war."

MR. ASQUITH AND HIS FAMILY

Asquith is a man of quite different mould. A jovial, sociable fellow, a friend of the ladies, especially young and beautiful ones he loves cheery surroundings and a good cook, and is supported by a cheery young wife. He was formerly a well-known lawyer, with a large income and many years' Parliamentary experience. Later he was known as a Minister under Gladstone, a pacifist like his friend Grey, and friendly to an understanding with Germany. He

treated all questions with an experienced business man's calm and certainty, and enjoyed good health and excellent nerves, steeled by assiduous golf.

His daughters went to a German boarding school and speak fluent German. We quickly became good friends with him and his family, and were guests at his little house on the Thames.

He only rarely occupied himself with foreign affairs. When important questions cropped up, with him lay the ultimate decision. During the critical days of July, Asquith often came to warn us, and he was ultimately in despair over the tragic turn of events. On August 2d, when I saw Asquith in order to make a final attempt, he was completely broken, and although quite calm, tears ran down his face.

SERBIAN CRISIS

The "Vorwaerts" of Berlin, in printing in the original German the following extracts, declared that these decisive "chapters are reproduced without abbreviation":

At the end of June, 1914, I proceeded to Kiel by order of the Kaiser. A few weeks before I had been given the honorary degree of Doctor at Oxford, a distinction conferred upon no German Ambassador since Herr von Bunsen. On board the *Meteor* [the Kaiser's yacht] we heard of the death of the Archduke, the heir to the Austrian throne. His Majesty expressed regret that his efforts to win the Archduke over to his ideas had thus been rendered vain. Whether the plan of pursuing an active policy against Serbia had already

been determined upon at Konopischt I cannot know.

As I was uninformed about views and events at Vienna, I attached no far-reaching importance to this event. Not until later was I able to establish the fact that among the Austrian aristocrats a feeling of relief outweighed other sentiments. One of his Majesty's other guests on board the *Meteor* was an Austrian, Count Felix Thun. Although the weather was splendid, he lay all the time in his cabin, suffering from seasickness. When the news arrived he was well; he had been cured either by the shock or by joy.

BERLIN WAS WARLIKE.

When I arrived in Berlin I saw the Imperial Chancellor, and said to him that I regarded our foreign situation as very satisfactory, since our relations with England were better than they had been for a

very long time past. I also remarked that a pacifist Ministry was in power in France.

Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg seemed not to share my optimism, and he complained about Russian armaments. I tried to calm him, and insisted especially that Russia had no interest in attacking us, and that such an attack would, moreover, never obtain the support of England and France, as both countries wanted peace.

I then went to Dr. Zimmermann [the Under Secretary] who was representing Herr von Jagow [Foreign Secretary], and from him I learned that Russia was about to raise 900,000 fresh troops. His words showed an unmistakable animosity against Russia, who, he said, was everywhere in our way. Difficulties about commercial policy were also involved. Of course I was not told that General von Moltke [Chief of the General Staff] was pressing for war. I learned, however, that Herr von Tschirschky [German Ambassador in Vienna] had re-

ceived a rebuke because he reported that he had advised moderation in Vienna toward Serbia.

I went to Silesia, and on my way back to London I spent only a few hours in Berlin, where I heard that Austria intended to proceed against Serbia, in order to put an end to an intolerable state of affairs.

Unfortunately I underestimated at the moment the importance of the news. I thought that nothing would come of it after all, and that, if Russia threatened, the trouble could easily be composed. Now I regret that I did not stay in Berlin and say at once that I would have no share in any such policy.

Subsequently I learned that at the decisive conversation at Potsdam on July 5th the inquiry addressed to us by Vienna found absolute assent among all the personages in authority; indeed, they added that there would be no harm if a war with Russia were to result. So, at any rate, it

is stated in the Austrian protocol which Count Mensdorff, Austrian Ambassador received in London. Soon afterward Herr von Jagow was in Vienna to discuss everything with Count Berchtold, Austrian Foreign Minister.

GREY'S COADJUTORS

The following appeared in the Stockholm "Politiken" on March 28th :

Sir Arthur Nicolson and Sir William Tyrrell had the greatest influence in the Foreign Office. The former was not our friend, but his attitude toward me was consistently correct and obliging. Our personal relations were of the best. Neither did he wish for war, but when we (? moved) against France he undoubtedly worked for immediate intervention. He was the confidant of my French colleague, and was in

constant touch with him, and was destined to succeed Lord Bertie in Paris. As is known, Sir Arthur was formerly Ambassador in St. Petersburg, and had concluded the treaty of 1907, which enabled Russia to turn again to the West and the Near East.

Sir Edward Grey's private secretary, Sir William Tyrrell, had far greater influence than the Permanent Under Secretary of State. This unusually intelligent man had been at a school in Germany, and had then entered the Diplomatic Service, but he was abroad only a short time. At first he belonged to the modern anti-German school of young English diplomats, but later he became a determined supporter of an understanding. To this aim and object he even influenced Sir Edward Grey, with whom he was very intimate. After the outbreak of war he left the department and went to the Home Office, probably in consequence of criticism of him for his Germanophile leanings.

CABALS AGAINST LICHNOWSKY

The rage of certain gentlemen over my success in London and the position I had achieved was indescribable. Schemes were set on foot to impede my carrying out my duties. I was left in complete ignorance of most important things, and I had to confine myself to sending in unimportant and dull reports. Secret reports from agents about things of which I could know nothing without spies and necessary funds were never available for me, and it was only in the last days of July, 1914, that I heard accidentally from the Naval Attaché of the secret Anglo-French agreement for joint action of the two fleets in case of war.

After my arrival I became convinced that in no circumstances need we fear a British attack or British support of a foreign attack, but that under all conditions England would protect France. I advanced this

opinion in repeated reports with detailed reasoning and insistence, but without gaining credence, although Lord Haldane's refusal of the formula of neutrality and England's attitude during the Morocco crisis were clear indications. In addition, the above-mentioned secret agreements were known to the department.

I repeatedly urged that England as a commercial State would suffer greatly in any war between the European great powers, and would therefore prevent such a war by all available means, but, on the other hand, in the interest of the European balance of power and to prevent Germany's overlordship would never tolerate the weakening or destruction of France. Lord Haldane told me this shortly after my arrival. All influential people spoke in the same way.

[The continuation of this part of the memorandum is taken up at this point by "Vorwaerts":]

I then received instructions that I was to induce the English press to take up a friendly attitude if Austria gave the "death blow" to the great Serbian movement, and so far as possible I was by my influence to prevent public opinion from opposing Austria. Recollections of the attitude of England during the annexation crisis, when public opinion showed sympathy for the Serbian rights in Bosnia, recollections also of the benevolent promotion of national movements in the time of Lord Byron and Garibaldi—these and other things spoke so strongly against the probability of support being given to the projected punitive expedition against the murderers that I considered it necessary to give an urgent warning. But I also gave a warning against the whole project, which I described as adventurous and dangerous, and I advised that moderation should be recommended to the Austrians, because I did not believe in the localization of the conflict.

JAGOW WOULD "RISK IT"

Herr von Jagow answered me that Russia was not ready; there would doubtless be a certain amount of bluster, but the more firmly we stood by Austria the more would Russia draw back. He said that Austria was already accusing us of want of spirit, and that we should not squeeze her. On the other hand, feeling in Russia was becoming ever more anti-German, and so we must simply risk it.

This attitude, as I learned later, was based upon reports from Count Pourtales [German Ambassador in Petrograd] to the effect that Russia would not move in any circumstances; these reports caused us to stimulate Count Berchtold to the greatest possible energy. Consequently I hoped for salvation from an English mediation, because I knew Sir Edward Grey's influence in Petrograd could be turned to use in favour of peace. So I used my friendly

relations with Sir Edward Grey, and in confidence begged him to advise moderation in Russia, if Austria, as it seemed, demanded satisfaction from the Serbs.

At first the attitude of the English press was calm and friendly to the Austrians, because the murder was condemned. But gradually more and more voices were heard to insist that, however necessary, the punishment of the crime, an exploitation of the crime for political purposes could not be justified. Austria was strongly urged to show moderation.

When the ultimatum appeared all the newspapers, with the exception of *The Standard*, which was always in low water and apparently was paid by the Austrians, were at one in their condemnation. The whole world, except in Berlin and Vienna, understood that it meant war, and indeed world-war. The British fleet, which chanced to be assembled for a review, was not demobilized.

At first I pressed for as conciliatory an answer as possible on the part of Serbia, since the attitude of the Russian Government left no further doubt of the seriousness of the situation.

The Serbian reply was in accordance with British efforts; M. Pashitch had actually accepted everything, except two points, about which he declared his readiness to negotiate. If Russia and England had wanted war, in order to fall upon us, a hint to Belgrade would have been sufficient, and the unheard-of [Austrian] note would have remained unanswered.

SIR EDWARD GREY'S PROPOSAL

Sir Edward Grey went through the Serbian reply with me, and pointed to the conciliatory attitude of the Government at Belgrade. We then discussed his mediation proposal, which was to arrange an interpretation of the two points acceptable

to both parties. M. Cambon [French Ambassador in London], the Marquis Imperiali [Italian Ambassador in London], and I should have met under Sir Edward Grey's presidency, and it would have been easy to find an acceptable form for the disputed points, which in the main concerned the participation of Austrian officials in the investigation at Belgrade. Given goodwill, everything could have been settled in one or two sittings, and the mere acceptance of the British proposal would have relieved the tension and would have further improved our relations to England. I urgently recommended the proposal, saying that otherwise world-war was imminent, in which we had everything to lose and nothing to gain. In vain! I was told that it was against the dignity of Austria, and that we did not want to interfere in the Serbian business, but left it to our ally. I was told to work for "localization of the conflict."

Of course it would only have needed a hint from Berlin to make Count Berchtold satisfy himself with a diplomatic success and put up with the Serbian reply. But this hint was not given. On the contrary, we pressed for war. What a fine success it would have been.

After our refusal Sir Edward asked us to come forward with a proposal of our own. We insisted upon war. I could get no other answer [from Berlin] than that it was an enormous "concession" on the part of Austria to contemplate no annexation of territory.

Thereupon Sir Edward justly pointed out that even without annexations of territory a country can be humiliated and subjected, and that Russia would regard this as a humiliation which she would not stand.

The impression became ever stronger that we desired war in all circumstances. Otherwise our attitude in a question which,

after all, did not directly concern us was unintelligible. The urgent appeals and definite declarations of M. Sazonoff [Russian Foreign Minister], later on the positively humble telegrams of the Czar, the repeated proposals of Sir Edward, the warnings of San Giuliano [Italian Foreign Minister], and of Bollati [Italian Ambassador in Berlin], my urgent advice—it was all of no use, for Berlin went on insisting that Serbia must be massacred.

The more I pressed, the less willing they were to alter their course, if only because I was not to have the success of saving peace in the company of Sir Edward Grey.

So Grey on July 29th resolved upon his well-known warning. I replied that I had always reported that we should have to reckon upon English hostility if it came to war with France. The Minister said to me repeatedly: "If war breaks out it will be the greatest catastrophe the world has ever seen."

GREY STILL SOUGHT PEACE

After that events moved rapidly. When Count Berchtold, who hitherto had played the strong man on instructions from Berlin, at last decided to change his course, we answered the Russian mobilization—after Russia had for a whole week negotiated and waited in vain—with our ultimatum and declaration of war.

Sir Edward Grey still looked for new ways of escape. In the morning of August 1st, Sir W. Tyrrell came to me to say that his chief still hoped to find a way out. Should we remain neutral if France did the same? I understood him to mean that we should then be ready to spare France, but his meaning was that we should remain absolutely neutral—neutral therefore even toward Russia. That was the well-known misunderstanding. Sir Edward had given me an appointment for the afternoon, but as he was then at a meeting of the Cabinet,

he called me up on the telephone, after Sir W. Tyrrell had hurried straight to him. But in the afternoon he spoke no longer of anything but Belgian neutrality, and of the possibility that we and France should face one another armed, without attacking one another.

Thus there was no proposal whatever, but a question without any obligation, because our conversation, as I have already explained, was to take place soon afterward. In Berlin, however—without waiting for the conversation—this news was used as the foundation for a far-reaching act. Then came Poincaré's letter, Bonar Law's letter, and the telegram from the King of the Belgians. The hesitating members of the Cabinet were converted, with the exception of three members, who resigned.

Up to the last moment I had hoped for a waiting attitude on the part of England. My French colleague also felt himself by no means secure, as I learned from a private

source. As late as August 1st the King replied evasively to the French President. But in the telegram from Berlin which announced the threatening danger of war, England was already mentioned as an opponent. In Berlin, therefore, one already reckoned upon war with England.

Before my departure Sir Edward Grey received me on August 5th at his house. I had gone there at his desire. He was deeply moved. He said to me that he would always be ready to mediate, and, "We don't want to crush Germany." Unfortunately this confidential conversation was published. Thereby Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg destroyed the last possibility of reaching peace via England.

Our departure was thoroughly dignified and calm. Before we left, the King had sent his equerry, Sir E. Ponsonby, to me, to express his regret at my departure and that he could not see me personally. Princess Louise wrote to me that the whole

family lamented our going. Mrs. Asquith and other friends came to the embassy to say good-bye.

A special train took us to Harwich, where a guard of honour was drawn up for me. I was treated like a departing sovereign. Thus ended my London mission. It was wrecked not by the perfidy of the British, but by the perfidy of our policy.

At the railway station in London Count Mensdorff [Austrian Ambassador] appeared with his staff. He was cheerful, and gave me to understand that perhaps he would remain in London. But to the English he said that it was not Austria, but we, who had wanted the war.

RETROSPECT

When now, after two years, I realize everything in retrospect, I say to myself that I realized too late that there was no place for me in a system which for years had lived only on tradition and routine,

and which tolerates only representatives who report what one wants to read. Absence of prejudice and an independent judgment are combated, want of ability and of character are extolled and esteemed, but successes arouse hostility and uneasiness.

I had abandoned opposition to our mad Triple Alliance policy, because I saw that it was useless and that my warnings were represented as Austrophobia and an *idée fixe*. In a policy which is not mere gymnastics, or playing with documents, but the conduct of the business of the firm, there is no such thing as likes and dislikes; there is nothing but the interest of the community; but a policy which is based merely upon Austrians, Magyars, and Turks must end in hostility to Russia, and ultimately lead to a catastrophe.

In spite of former aberrations, everything was still possible in July, 1914. Agreement with England had been reached. We should have had to send to Petersburg

a representative who, at any rate, reached the average standard of political ability, and we should have had to give Russia the certainty that we desired neither to dominate the Starits nor to throttle the Serbs. M. Sazonoff was saying to us: "*Lâchez l'Autriche et nous lâcherons les Français.*" and M. Cambon [French Ambassador in Berlin] said to Herr von Jagow: "*Vous n'avez [pas] besoin de suivre l'Autriche partout.*"

We needed neither alliances nor wars, but merely treaties which would protect us and others, and which would guarantee us an economic development for which there had been no precedent in history. And if Russia had been relieved of trouble in the west, she would have been able to turn again to the east, and then the Anglo-Russian antagonism would have arisen automatically without our interference—and the Russo-Japanese antagonism no less than the Anglo-Russian.

We could also have approached the question of limitation of armaments, and should have had no further need to bother about the confusions of Austria. Austria-Hungary would then become the vassal of the German Empire—without an alliance, and, above all, without sentimental services on our part, leading ultimately to war for the liberation of Poland and the destruction of Serbia, although German interests demanded exactly the contrary.

I had to support in London a policy which I knew to be fallacious. I was punished for it, for it was a sin against the Holy Ghost.

ARRIVAL AT BERLIN

On my arrival in Berlin I saw at once that I was to be made the scapegoat for the catastrophe of which our Government had made itself guilty in opposition to my advice and my warnings.

The report was persistently circulated

by official quarters that I had let myself be deceived by Sir Edward Grey, because if he had not wanted war Russia would not have mobilized. Count Pourtales, whose reports could be relied upon, was to be spared, if only because of his family connections. He was said to have behaved "splendidly," and he was enthusiastically praised, while I was all the more sharply blamed.

"What has Russia got to do with Serbia?" this statesman said to me after eight years of official activity in Petersburg. It was made out that the whole business was a perfidious British trick which I had not understood. In the Foreign Office I was told that in 1916 it would in any case have come to war. But then Russia would have been "ready," and so it was better now.

QUESTION OF GUILT

As appears from all official publications, without the facts being controverted by

our own White Book which, owing to its poverty and gaps, constitutes a grave self-accusation:

1. We encouraged Count Berchtold to attack Serbia, although no German interest was involved, and the danger of a world-war must have been known to us—whether we knew the text of the ultimatum is a question of complete indifference.

2. In the days between July 23 and July 30, 1914, when M. Sazonoff emphatically declared that Russia could not tolerate an attack upon Serbia, we rejected the British proposals of mediation, although Serbia, under Russian and British pressure, had accepted almost the whole ultimatum, and although an agreement about the two points in question could easily have been reached, and Count Berchtold was even ready to satisfy himself with the Serbian reply.

3. On July 30th, when Count Berchtold wanted to give way, we, without Austria

having been attacked, replied to Russia's mere mobilization by sending an ultimatum to Petersburg, and on July 31st we declared war on the Russians, although the Czar had pledged his word that as long as negotiations continued not a man should march—so that we deliberately destroyed the possibility of a peaceful settlement.

In view of these indisputable facts, it is not surprising that the whole civilized world outside Germany attributes to us the sole guilt for the world-war.

Is it not intelligible that our enemies declare that they will not rest until a system is destroyed which constitutes a permanent threatening of our neighbours? Must they not otherwise fear that in a few years they will again have to take up arms, and again see their provinces overrun and their towns and villages destroyed? Were these people not right who prophesied that the spirit of Treitschke and Bernhardi dominated the German people—the spirit which glorifies

war as an aim in itself and does not abhor it as an evil; that among us it is still the feudal knights and Junkers and the caste of warriors who rule and who fix our ideals and our values—not the civilian gentleman; that the love of duelling, which inspires our youth at the universities, lives on in those who guide the fortunes of the people? Had not the events at Zabern and the Parliamentary debates on that case shown foreign countries how civil rights and freedoms are valued among us, when questions of military power are on the other side?

Cramb, a historian who has since died, an admirer of Germany, put the German point of view into the words of Euphorion:

Träumt Ihr den Friedenstag?
Träume, wer träumen mag!
Krieg ist das Losungswort!
Sieg, und so klingt es fort.

Militarism, really a school for the nation and an instrument of policy, makes policy into the instrument of military power, if

the patriarchal absolutism of a soldier-kingdom renders possible an attitude which would not be permitted by a democracy which had disengaged itself from military-Junker influences.

That is what our enemies think, and that is what they are bound to think, when they see that, in spite of capitalistic industrialization, and in spite of Socialistic organization, the living, as Friedrich Nietzsche says, are still governed by the dead. The principal war aim of our enemies, the democratization of Germany will be achieved.

OUR FUTURE

Today, after two years of the war, there can be no further doubt that we cannot hope for an unconditional victory over Russians, English, French, Italians, Rumanians, and Americans, and that we cannot reckon upon the overthrow of our enemies. But we can reach a compromise peace only

upon the basis of the evacuation of the occupied territories, the possession of which in any case signifies for us a burden and weakness and the peril of new wars. Consequently everything should be avoided which hinders a change of course on the part of those enemy groups which might perhaps still be won over to the idea of compromise—the British Radicals and the Russian Reactionaries. Even from this point of view our Polish project is just as objectionable as any interference with Belgian rights, or the execution of British citizens—to say nothing of the mad submarine war scheme.

Our future lies upon the water. True, but it therefore does not lie in Poland and Belgium, in France and Serbia. That is a reversion to the Holy Roman Empire, to the aberrations of the Hohenstaufens and Hapsburgs. It is the policy of the Plantagenets, not the policy of Drake and Raleigh, Nelson and Rhodes.

“Triple Alliance policy is a relapse into the past, a revolt from the future, from Imperialism, from world policy. Central Europe is mediævalism; Berlin-Bagdad is a *cul-de-sac*, and not a road into the open, to unlimited possibilities, and to the world mission of the German people.

I am no enemy of Austria, or Hungary, or Italy, or Serbia, or any other State; I am only an enemy of the Triple Alliance policy, which was bound to divert us from our aims, and to bring us on to the sloping plane of continental policy. It was not German policy, but Austrian dynastic policy. The Austrians had accustomed themselves to regard the alliance as a shield, under whose protection they could make excursions at pleasure into the East.

And what result have we to expect from the struggle of peoples? The United States of Africa will be British, like the United States of America, of Australia, and of

Oceania; and the Latin States of Europe, as I said years ago, will fall into the same relationship to the United Kingdom as the Latin sisters of America to the United States. They will be dominated by the Anglo-Saxon; France, exhausted by the war, will link herself still more closely to Great Britain. In the long run, Spain also will not resist.

In Asia, the Russians and Japanese will expand their borders and their customs, and the south will remain to the British.

The world will belong to the Anglo-Saxon, the Russian, and the Japanese, and the German will remain alone with Austria and Hungary. His sphere of power will be that of thought and of trade, not that of the bureaucrats and the soldiers. The German appeared too late, and the world-war has destroyed the last possibility of catching up the lost ground, of founding a Colonial Empire.

For we shall not supplant the sons of

Japheth; the program of the great Rhodes, who saw the salvation of mankind in British expansion and British Imperialism, will be realized.

Tu regere imperio populos Romano, memento.
Hæ tibi erunt artes: pacisque imponere morem,
Parcere subjectis et debellare superbos.

WHAT THIS "MEMORANDUM" IS

The war has produced few human documents of the importance of Prince Lichnowsky's "Memorandum." It throws a flood of light upon the diplomatic correspondence published by the belligerent chancelleries in the opening months of the war, particularly upon the German White Paper, whose reservations it exposes, whose enigmas it untangles, whose lies it lays bare.

It is the diplomatic story of the Prince's Ambassadorship at London, from 1912 until the war drove him home to Berlin in August, 1914, when he was deprived of rank and distinctions.

It was written at his country seat, Kuchelna, in the summer of 1916, and finished in August. He says that he wrote it for his family archives and that these "purely private notes

found their way into wider circles by an unprecedented breach of confidence."

Be that as it may, one copy reached the Wilhelmstrasse, where it created a great scandal; another fell into the hands of some member of the Minority Socialist Party, and another reached the office of the "Politiken" of Stockholm, organ of the Extreme Left of the Swedish Socialist Party, which began to publish it on March 15th, and was then stopped by the Government.

The next day there was a furious debate in the Main Committee of the German Reichstag. Herr von Payer, Vice-Chancellor of the German Empire, and Under Secretary von Stumm, of the Foreign Office, sought to explain to representatives of the German people the diplomatic catastrophe of which the Kaiser's Government was the victim. Herr von Jagow, who had been Germany's Foreign Secretary during the closing days of Prince Lichnowsky's career at London, was assigned to reply to the famous memorandum which the

author had entitled "My London Mission, 1912-1914." This reply was published in THE NEW YORK TIMES on April 7th.

Meanwhile, the German Socialist organ "Vorwaerts" had published what it called "decisive chapters" of the memorandum—the diplomatic passages which pointed out Germany's criminality and foretold the result of this criminality in history. The "Muenchener Neueste Nachrichten" then gave its readers the chapters dealing with the African and Bagdad treaties negotiated by the Prince, and on March 26th, the "Politiken" renewed publication of the Lichnowsky writings.

The earlier installment issued by the Stockholm paper appears to be the complete introduction to the main chapters of the memorandum. It appeared in "The New Europe" of London.

LICHNOWSKY'S STORY ¹

WE publish in full today Prince Lichnowsky's famous "Memorandum," printed piecemeal in Germany and Sweden, suppressed, springing out again after its suppression, refusing to be downed despite the arrest of distributors and the confiscation of copies, the cause of anxious debate in the Main Committee of the Reichstag; as hard a blow to Germany as the defeat of an army. For, though its purport is nothing more than what all the world knows—that the responsibility of this war rests on Germany—it is a terrible revelation of the hard levity and the brutal cynicism with which she plunged the world into what Sir Edward Grey warned Lichnowsky would be "the greatest catastrophe the world has ever seen."

¹Reprinted, with permission from *The New York Times*, April 21, 1918.

As for Austria, she, too, appears in a clear light in Lichnowsky's pitiless exposure of the conspiracy which brought about the war. She cuts even a more contemptible figure than the world has accorded to her. As conscienceless and unprincipled as Germany, she is yet shown as having even in those days no identity of her own, as being merely Germany's spaniel, ready to run at her word and come back at her call, as being then what we all supposed her to have sunk to in later times. Nominally the cause of war was Austria's, and from Austria seems to have come the first suggestion; but the suggestion having been seized upon with joy by the Potsdam conference of July 5, 1914, thereafter Germany took the reins in her hands and drove remorselessly straight down her determined road to war.

In this light how pitiably hypocritical become the solemn documents set forth in the German White Paper, and all the lying attempts to put the blame upon Russia,

upon England, upon any victim who came to hand! Between the ultimatum of July 23d, and the outbreak of war everybody from the Kaiser down was gravely pretending to be seeking some way out, some way of securing peace; making it appear how unfortunate it was that this was a matter concerning Austria only, in which it would be improper for Germany to interfere. All the time it was Germany which was urging Austria on. At the end, the Kaiser sadly said that the sword "had been forced into my hand." He had had the sword in his hand ever since the Potsdam conference of July 5th, only he had concealed it behind his back; now he was bringing it out.

In his letter to his brother-in-law, Sixtus, Kaiser Karl spoke of the war as one "for which no responsibility can fall on me." It was enigmatic; did he mean that it fell on Kaiser Wilhelm or on Kaiser Franz Josef, or on both? But Lichnowsky's revelation leaves no doubt; Kaiser Franz Josef was not

even a partner in the guilt, only a humble instrument. Count Mensdorff, the Austrian Ambassador in London, "said that it was not Austria, but we, who had wanted the war." So says Lichnowsky; and all the evidence disproves the suspicion that Mensdorff may have been merely lying for the purpose of transferring the sin to other shoulders. Even if he had been, he did not dream of trying to transfer it to English or Russian shoulders.

When Lichnowsky heard of the assassination of Franz Ferdinand and Sophia, he "attached no far-reaching importance to this event." Neither did anybody else outside of Berlin and Vienna; nobody dreamed that within a week the Potsdam conspirators would decide on making it the pretext of their war. It was only a pretext; the Serajevo assassination was not the cause of the war. What was the real cause? Lichnowsky did not learn it until later. It was this:

In the Foreign Office I was told that in 1916 it would in any case have come to war. But then Russia would have been "ready," and so it was better now.

The assumption that there must necessarily be a war with Russia within two years rested on nothing but the fact that Germany and Austria wanted to dominate the Balkans. Elsewhere in his "Memorandum" Prince Lichnowsky argues to prove not only that there was no German necessity for this policy but that her real interests lay elsewhere, in directions where there was neither danger nor even possibility of war. But to give up this Balkan policy and seek those other directions would have given no satisfaction to the spirit which, Lichnowsky says, "dominates the German people—the spirit which glorifies war as an aim in itself and does not abhor it as an evil."

Attaching, as he said, "no far-reaching importance" to the Serajevo murders, Lichnowsky went to Berlin with a tranquil heart

and found there an atmosphere that puzzled him. He found Zimmermann talking mysteriously about how "Russia was everywhere in our way." He could get no light on the baffling environment he found there, except this:

I learned, however, that Herr von Tschirschky [German Ambassador in Vienna] had received a rebuke because he reported that he had advised moderation in Vienna toward Serbia.

Tschirschky, evidently, was as honest and unsuspecting as Lichnowsky. He assumed that Germany did not want war. He did not know that while he was innocently complicating things by advising Vienna to be moderate this momentous thing had happened at Potsdam:

Subsequently I learned that at the decisive conversation at Potsdam on July 5th the inquiry addressed to us by Vienna found absolute assent among all the personages in authority; indeed, they added that there would be no harm if a war with Russia were to result. So, at any rate, it is stated in the Austrian protocol which Count Mensdorff, Austrian Ambassador, received in London.

Then came the ultimatum, and Serbia's reply, agreeing to everything, except two points on which she proposed arbitration. Concerning this, Prince Lichnowsky points out:

If Russia and England had wanted war in order to fall upon us, a hint to Belgrade would have been sufficient, and the unheard-of [Austrian] note would have remained unanswered.

Lichnowsky innocently seconded all Sir Edward Grey's proposals to avert war, and he received the same lying answer that was made to Grey, to the Czar, and to all the rest—"that we did not want to interfere in the Serbian business, but left it to our ally." He knew nothing of the Potsdam plot of July 5th, but he must have suspected then what he sees now, that the pretence was absurd; for—

of course it would only have needed a hint from Berlin to make Count Berchtold [Austrian Foreign Minister] satisfy himself with a diplomatic success

and put up with the Serbian reply. But this hint was not given. On the contrary, we pressed for war.

As the days went on he became suspicious, when Germany ignored "the positively humble telegrams of the Czar," the repeated proposals of Grey, and all the other attempts to avert the blow; "it was all of no use, for Berlin went on insisting that Serbia must be massacred."

"Berlin!" Who was "Berlin?" To get an answer to that question we must step aside for a moment from Lichnowsky's revelations and turn to those of Dr. Muehlon, the Krupp Director who resigned from the Directorate because of his horror at the conspiracy he had unearthed. *The Times* also prints this revelation in full today. Dr. Muehlon exonerates Foreign Minister von Jagow from responsibility for the terms of the Austrian memorandum. When the matter reached him "the Kaiser had so committed himself that it was too late for any

procedure according to diplomatic custom, and there was nothing more to be done." Herr Krupp von Boehlen told Muehlon that "Germany ought not, in such a tremendous affair, to have given a blank check to a State like Austria." Who gave the blank check? The Kaiser himself, who told Krupp von Boehlen "that this time people would see that he did not turn about."

The Kaiser's repeated insistence that this time nobody would be able to accuse him of indecision had, he [von Boehlen] said, been almost comic in its effect.

The Kaiser's place is fixed at last. He was only one of the Potsdam plotters, but he carried out their plans with an eager efficiency that made war inescapable. The moment he began to rattle his sword he made what in other men would have been mistakes, because they were grotesque; they were too wildly foolish for any of the wiser members of the Potsdam gang to have committed, but they acted marvellously to

cut off any escape from war, and that was, after all, what was wanted by the whole crew.

Knowing nothing of all this, "Sir Edward Grey still looked for new ways of escape." We know how he failed; Berlin was not only resolved on war with France and Russia, but was even then, Lichnowsky tells us, "reckoning upon war with England." It came, and—

Thus ended my London mission. It was wrecked not by the perfidy of the British, but by the perfidy of our policy.

It is not surprising, he concludes, "that the whole civilized world outside Germany attributes to us the sole guilt for the world-war." And he gives the reason why we are fighting her in two sentences which sum up our war aims as well as even President Wilson himself has ever done:

Is it not intelligible that our enemies declare that they will not rest until a system is destroyed which

constitutes a permanent threatening of our neighbours? Must they not otherwise fear that in a few years they will again have to take up arms and again see their provinces overrun and their towns and villages destroyed?

FORMER GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER
JAGOW'S REPLY TO LICHNOWSKY'S
STATEMENT

Jagow's reply to Lichnowsky's Memorandum is here given in full. Although summaries and what purported to be full translations of the text have appeared both here and abroad, this is the first definitive translation that has been published in English. It has been made especially for THE NEW YORK TIMES.

The only point on which Jagow fully scores, according to German comment at hand, is his charge of the Prince's exaggerated ego and his melancholy disappointment because the Wilhelmstrasse did not accept his judgment in regard to England and so prevent the world-war.

All of Jagow's contradictions, whether consisting of facts, opinions, judgments, or impressions, are matters of viewpoint, some of which may be explained by his confession that the Wilhelmstrasse did not keep the Kaiser's Ambassador at London fully informed. When he denies, however, that San Giuliano's warning to Vienna is unknown, he has only to look up what was said in the Italian Chamber on Dec. 5, 1914, to become acquainted with it.

The full text of the Jagow statement, which was written in Munich on March 20th and printed in the evening edition of the semi-official "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung" on March 23d, follows:

So far as it is possible, in general, I shall refrain from taking up the statements concerning the policy obtaining before my administration of the Foreign Office.

I should like to make the following remarks about the individual points of the article:

When I was named State Secretary in January, 1913, I regarded a German-English rapprochement as desirable and also believed an agreement attainable on the points where our interests touched or crossed each other. At all events, I wanted to try to work in this sense. A principal point for us was the Mesopotamia-Asia Minor question—the so-called Bagdad policy—as this had become for us a question of prestige. If England wanted to force us out there it certainly appeared to me that a conflict could hardly be avoided. In Berlin I began, as soon as it was possible to do so, to negotiate over the Bagdad railroad. We found a favourable disposition on the part of the English Government, and the result was the agreement that was almost complete when the world-war broke out.

COLONIAL QUESTIONS

At the same time the negotiations over the Portuguese colonies that had been begun by Count

Metternich (as German Ambassador at London), continued by Baron Marschall, and reopened by Prince Lichnowsky, were under way. I intended to carve the way later for further negotiations regarding other—for example, East Asiatic—problems, when what was in my opinion the most important problem, that of the Bagdad railroad, should be settled, and an atmosphere of more confidence thus created. I also left the naval problem aside, as it would have been difficult to have reached an early agreement over that matter, after past experiences.

I can pass over the development of the Albanian problem, as it occurred before my term of office began. In general, however, I would like to remark that such far-reaching disinterestedness in Balkan questions as Prince Lichnowsky proposes does not seem possible to me. It would have contradicted the essential part of the alliance if we had completely ignored the really vital interests of our ally. We, too, had demanded that Austria stand by us at Algeciras, and at that time Italy's attitude had caused serious resentment among us. Russia, although she had no interest at all in Morocco also stood by France. Finally, it was our task, as the third member of the alliance, to support such measures as would render possible a settlement of the divergent interests of our allies and avoid a conflict between them.

It further appeared impossible to me not to pursue a "Triple Alliance policy" in matters where the

interests of the allied powers touched each other. Then Italy would have been driven entirely into line with the Entente in questions of the Orient, and Austria handed over to the mercy of Russia, and the Triple Alliance would thus have really gone to pieces. And we, too, would not have been able to have looked after our interests in the Orient, if we did not have some support. And even Prince Lichnowsky does not deny that we had to represent great economic interests right there. But today economic interests are no longer to be separated from political ones.

That the people in Petrograd wanted to see the Sultan independent is an assertion that Prince Lichnowsky will hardly be able to prove; it would contradict every tradition of Russian policy. If we, furthermore, had not had at our command the influence at Constantinople founded by Baron Marschall, it would hardly have been possible for us to have defended our economic interests in Turkey in the desired way.

RUSSIA AND GERMANY

When Prince Lichnowsky further asserts that we only "drove Russia, our natural friend and best neighbour, into the arms of France and England through our Oriental and Balkan policy" he is in conflict with the historical facts. Only because Prince Gortschakof [Russian Premier] was guiding Russian policy toward a rapprochement with a

France lusting for revenge was Prince Bismarck induced to enter into the alliance with Austria-Hungary; through the alliance with Rumania he barred an advance of Russia toward the south. Prince Lichnowsky condemns the basic principles of Bismarck's policy. Our attempts to draw closer to Russia went to pieces—Björki proves it—or remained ineffective, like the so-called Potsdam agreement. Also, Russia was not always our "best neighbour." Under Queen Elizabeth, as at present, she strove for possession of East Prussia to extend her Baltic coasts and to insure her domination of the Baltic. The Petrograd "window" has gradually widened, so as to take in Esthonia, Livonia, Courland, and Finland and reach after Aland. Poland was arranged to be a field over which to send troops against us. Pan-Slavism, which was dominating the Russian policy to an ever greater degree, had positive anti-German tendencies.

And we did not force Russia to drop "her policy of Asiatic expansion," but only tried to defend ourselves against her encroachments in European policy and her encircling of our Austro-Hungarian ally.

GREY CONCILIATORY

Just as little as Sir Edward Grey [British Foreign Secretary] did we want war to come over Albania. Therefore, in spite of our unhappy experi-

ence at Algeciras, we agreed to a conference. The credit of an "attitude of mediation" at the conference should not be denied Sir Edward Grey; but that he "by no means placed himself on the side of the Entente" is, however, surely saying rather too much. Certainly he often advised yielding in Petrograd (as we did in Vienna) and found "formulas of agreement," but in dealing with the other side he represented the Entente, because he, no less than ourselves, neither would, nor could, abandon his associates. That we, on the other hand, "without exception, represented the standpoint dictated to us from Vienna," is absolutely false. We, like England, played a mediatory rôle, and also in Vienna counselled far more yielding and moderation than Prince Lichnowsky appears to know about, or even to suggest. And then Vienna made several far-reaching concessions (Dibra, Djakowa). If Prince Lichnowsky, who always wanted to be wiser than the Foreign Office, and who apparently allowed himself to be strongly influenced by the Entente statesmen, did not know this, he surely ought not to make any false assertions now! If, to be sure, the degree of yielding that was necessary was reached in Vienna, we also naturally had to represent the Austrian standpoint at the conference. Ambassador Szögyeni himself was not one of the extremists; in Vienna they were by no means always satisfied with his attitude. That the Ambassador, with whom I was negotiating almost every day, constantly sounded the refrain of *casus fœderis* is

entirely unknown to me. It certainly is true that Prince Lichnowsky for some time already was not counted as a friend of Austria in Vienna. Still complaints about him came to my ears oftener from the side of Marquis San Giuliano [Italian Foreign Minister] than from the side of Count Berchtold, [Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister].

King Nicholas's seizure of Scutari constituted a mockery of the entire conference and a snub to all the powers taking part in it.

Russia was by no means obliged "to give way to us all along the line"; on the contrary, she "advanced the wishes of Serbia" in several ways, Serbia even receiving some cities and strips of territory that could have been regarded as purely Albanian or preponderatingly so. Prince Lichnowsky says that "the course of the conference was a fresh humiliation for the self-consciousness of Russia" and that there was a feeling of resentment in Russia on that account. It cannot be the task of our policy to satisfy all the unjustified demands of the exaggerated self-consciousness of a power by no means friendly to us, at the cost of our ally. Russia has no vital interests on the Adriatic, but our ally certainly has. If we, as Prince Lichnowsky seems to wish, had flatly taken the same stand as Russia, the result would have been a humiliation for Austria-Hungary and thus a weakening of our group. Prince Lichnowsky seems only anxious that Russia be not humiliated; a humiliation of Austria is apparently a matter of indifference to him.

THE WILY VENIZELOS

When Prince Lichnowsky says that our "Austrophilie" was not adapted to "promote Russia's interests in Asia," I don't exactly understand what this means. Following a disastrous diversion toward East Asia—in the Japanese war we had favoured Russia without even being thanked for it!—Russia again took up her policy directed toward the European Orient (the Balkans and Constantinople) with renewed impulse (the Balkan Alliance, Buchlau, Iswolsky, etc.). [Iswolsky retired as Russian Foreign Minister after Germany forced the Czar to repudiate his Serbian policy in 1909.]

Venizelos, the cunning Cretan with the "Ribbon of the Order of the Red Eagle," evidently knew how to throw a little sand into the eyes of our Ambassador. He, in contrast to King Constantine and Theototy, always was pro-Entente. His present attitude reveals his feelings as clearly as can be. Herr Daneff, however, was entirely inclined toward Petrograd.

That Count Berchtold displayed certain inclinations toward Bulgaria also in its differences with Rumania is true; that we "naturally went with him" is, however, entirely false. With our support, King Carol had the satisfaction of the Bucharest peace. [Ended second Balkan war.] If, therefore, in the case of the Bucharest peace in which we favoured the wishes and interests of Rumania, which was allied to us, our policy deviated somewhat

from that of Vienna, the Austro-Hungarian Cabinet certainly did not believe—as Prince Lichnowsky asserts—that it “could count upon our support in case of its revision.” That Marquis San Giuliano “is said to have warned us already in the summer of 1913 from becoming involved in a world-war,” because at that time in Austria “the thought of a campaign against Serbia” had found entrance, is entirely unknown to me. Just as little do I know that Herr von Tschirschky—who certainly was rather pessimistic by nature—is said to have declared in the spring of 1914 that there soon would be war. Therefore, I was just as ignorant of the “important happenings” that Prince Lichnowsky here suspects as he was himself! Such events as the English visit to Paris—Sir Edward Grey’s first to the Continent—surely must have been known to the Ambassador, and we informed him about the secret Anglo-Russian naval agreement; to be sure, he did not want to believe it!

In the matter of Liman von Sanders [German reorganizer of the Turkish Army], we made a far-reaching concession to Russia by renouncing the General’s power of command over Constantinople. I will admit that this point of the agreement over the military mission was not opportune politically.

When Prince Lichnowsky boasts of having succeeded in giving the treaty a form corresponding to our wishes, this credit must not be denied him, although it certainly required strong pressure on

several occasions to induce him to represent some of our desires with more emphasis.

When Prince Lichnowsky says that he received the authorization definitely to conclude the treaty, after he previously asserts that "the treaty was consequently dropped," this contains a contradiction which we may let the Prince straighten out. Lichnowsky's assertion, however, that we delayed publication because the treaty would have been "a public success" for him that we begrudged him, is an unheard-of insinuation that can be explained only through his self-centred conception of things. The treaty would have lost its practical and moral effect—one of its main objects was to create a good atmosphere between us and England—if its publication had been greeted with violent attacks upon "perfidious Albion" in our Anglophobe press and in our Parliament. And there is no doubt but that, in view of our internal position at that time, this is what the simultaneous publication of the so-called Windsor Treaty would have caused. And the howl about English perfidy that the internal contradiction between the text of the Windsor Treaty and our treaty would doubtless have called forth would hardly have been stilled in the minds of our public through the assurance of English *bona fides*.

"UNTENABLE" CHARGES

With justified precaution, we intended to allow the publication to be made only at the proper mo-

ment, when the danger of disapproving criticism was no longer so acute, if possible simultaneously with the announcement of the Bagdad Treaty, which also was on the point of being concluded. The fact that two great agreements had been concluded between us and England would doubtless have materially favoured their reception and made it easier to overlook the æsthetic defects of the Portuguese agreement. It was consideration for the effect of the agreement with which we wanted to improve our relations with England, but not to generate more trouble, that caused our hesitation.

It is correct that—although in a secondary degree—consideration was also taken of the efforts just then being made to obtain economic interests in the Portuguese colonies, which the publication of the agreement would naturally have made more difficult to realize. These conditions Prince Lichnowsky may not have been able to perceive fully from London, but he should have trusted in our objective judgment and acquiesced in it, instead of replacing his lack of understanding with suspicions and the interjection of personal motives. He certainly would have found our arguments understood by the English statesmen themselves.

The Ambassador’s speeches aroused considerable adverse sentiment in this country. It was necessary for the creation of a better atmosphere, in which alone the rapprochement being worked for could flourish, that confidence in our English policy and in our London Ambassador be spread also

among our people at home. Prince Lichnowsky, otherwise so susceptible to public opinion, did not take this motive sufficiently into account, for he saw everything only through his London spectacles. The charges against the attitude of the Foreign Office are too untenable to be bothered with. I would only like to point out that Prince Lichnowsky was not left in ignorance regarding the "most important things," in so far as they were of value to his mission. On the contrary, I gave the Ambassador much more general information than used to be the custom. My own experiences as Ambassador induced me to do so. But with Lichnowsky there was the inclination to rely more upon his own impressions and judgment than upon the information and advice of the central office. To be sure, I did not always have either the motive or the authority to impart the sources of our news. Here there were quite definite considerations, particularly anxiety regarding the compromising of our sources. The Prince's Memorandum furnishes the best justification for the caution exercised in this regard.

DEFENCE OF ARCHDUKE

It is not true that in the Foreign Office the reports that England would protect France under all circumstances were not believed.

At Knopischt, on the occasion of the visit of his Majesty the Kaiser to the Archduke heir apparent, no plan of an active policy against Serbia was laid

down. Archduke Franz Ferdinand was not at all the champion of a policy leading to war for which he has often been taken. During the London conference he advised moderation and the avoidance of war.

Prince Lichnowsky's "optimism" was hardly justified, as he has probably convinced himself since through the revelations of the Soukhomlinof trial. Besides, the secret Anglo-Russian naval agreement (of which, as said before, he was informed) should have made him more skeptical. Unfortunately, the suspicion voiced by the Imperial Chancellor and the Under Secretary of State was well-grounded. How does this agree with the assertion that we, relying upon the reports of Count Pourtales that "Russia would not move under any circumstances," had not thought of the possibility of a war? Furthermore, so far as I can recollect, Count Pourtales [German Ambassador at St. Petersburg] never made such reports.

BLAME FOR RUSSIA

That Austria-Hungary wished to proceed against the constant provocations stirred up by Russia (Herr von Hartwig), that reached their climax in the outrage of Serajevo, we had to recognize as justified. In spite of all the former settlements and avoidances of menacing conflicts, Russia did not abandon her policy, which aimed at the complete exclusion of the Austrian influence (and

naturally ours also) from the Balkans. The Russian agents, inspired by Petrograd, continued their incitement. It was a question of the prestige and the existence of the Danube Monarchy. It must either put up with the Russo-Serbian machinations, or command a *quos ego*, even at the risk of a war. We could not leave our ally in the lurch. Had the intention been to exclude the *ultima ratio* of the war in general, the alliance should not have been concluded. Besides, it was plain that the Russian military preparations (for instance, the extension of the railroads and forts in Poland), for which a France lusting for revenge had lent the money and which would have been completed in a few years, were directed principally against us. But despite all this, despite the fact that the aggressive tendency of the Russian policy was becoming more evident from day to day, the idea of a preventive war was far removed from us. We only decided to declare war on Russia in the face of the Russian mobilization and to prevent a Russian invasion.

I have not the letters exchanged with the Prince at hand—it was a matter of private letters. Lichnowsky pleaded for the abandonment of Austria. I replied, so far as I remember, that we, aside from our treaty obligation, could not sacrifice our ally for the uncertain friendship of England. If we abandoned our only reliable ally later we would stand entirely isolated, face to face with the Entente. It is likely that I also wrote that "Russia was constantly becoming more anti-German" and

that we must "just risk it." Furthermore, it is possible that I, in order to steel Lichnowsky's nerves a little and to prevent him from exposing his views also in London, may also have written that there would probably be some "bluster": that "the more firmly we stood by Austria the sooner Russia would yield." I have said already that our policy was not based upon alleged reports excluding war; certainly at that time I still thought war could be avoided, but, like all of us, I was fully aware of the very serious danger.

We could not agree to the English proposal of a conference of Ambassadors, for it would doubtless have led to a serious diplomatic defeat. For Italy, too, was pro-Serb and, with her Balkan interests, stood rather opposed to Austria. The "intimacy of the Russo-Italian relations" is admitted by Prince Lichnowsky himself. The best and only feasible way of escape was a localization of the conflict and an understanding between Vienna and Petrograd. We worked toward that end with all our energy. That we "insisted upon" the war is an unheard-of assertion which is sufficiently invalidated by the telegrams of his Majesty the Kaiser to the Czar and to King George, published in the White Books—Prince Lichnowsky only cares to tell about "the really humble telegram of the Czar"—as well as the instruction we sent to Vienna. The worst caricature is formed by the sentence:

"When Count Berchtold finally decided to come around we answered the Russian mobilization,

after Russia had vainly negotiated and waited a whole week, with the ultimatum and the declaration of war."

In quoting Lichnowsky, Herr von Jagow omits the former's statement that Count Berchtold "hitherto had played the strong man on instructions from Berlin."

"WRONG" CONCLUSIONS

Should we, perhaps, have waited until the mobilized Russian Army was streaming over our borders? The reading of the Soukhomlinof trial has probably given even Prince Lichnowsky a feeling of *Oh si tacuisses!* On July 5th I was absent from Berlin. The declaration that I was "shortly thereafter in Vienna" "in order to talk everything over with Count Berchtold" is false. I returned to Berlin on July 6th from my honeymoon trip and did not leave there until August 15th on the occasion of the shifting of the Great Headquarters. As Secretary of State I was only once in Vienna before the war, in the spring of 1913.

Prince Lichnowsky lightly passed over the matter of the confusing dispatch that he sent us on August 1st—at present I am now in possession of the exact wording—as a "misunderstanding," and even seems to want to reproach us because "in Berlin the news, without first waiting for the conversation, was made the basis of a far-reaching action." The question of war with England was a

matter of minutes, and immediately after the arrival of the dispatch it was decided to make an eleventh-hour attempt to avoid war with France and England. His Majesty sent the well-known telegram to King George. The contents of the Lichnowsky dispatch could not have been understood any other way than we understood it.

Objectively taken, the statement of Prince Lichnowsky presents such an abundance of inaccuracies and distortions that it is hardly a wonder that his conclusions are also entirely wrong. The reproach that we sent an ultimatum on July 30th to Petrograd merely because of the mobilization of Russia and on July 31st declared war upon the Russians, although the Czar had pledged his word that not a man should march so long as negotiations were under way, thus wilfully destroying the possibility of a peaceful adjustment, has really a grotesque effect. In concluding, the statement seems almost to identify itself with the standpoint of our enemies.

When the Ambassador makes the accusation that our policy identified itself “with Turks and Austro-Magyars” and “subjected itself to the viewpoints of Vienna and Budapest,” he may be suitably answered that he saw things only through London spectacles and from the narrow point of view of his desired rapprochement with England *à tout prix*. He also appears to have forgotten completely that the Entente was formed much more against us than against Austria.

I, too, pursued a policy which aimed at an understanding with England, because I was of the opinion that this was the only way for us to escape from the unfavourable position in which we were placed by the unequal division of strength and the weakness of the Triple Alliance. But Russia and France insisted upon war. We were obligated through our treaty with Austria, and our position as a great power was also threatened—*hic Rhodus, hic salta*. But England, that was not allied in the same way with Russia and that had received far-reaching assurances from us regarding the sparing of France and Belgium, seized the sword.

In saying this, I by no means share the opinion prevalent among us today that England laid all the mines for the outbreak of the war; on the contrary, I believe in Sir Edward Grey's love of peace and in his earnest wish to arrive at an agreement with us. But he had allowed himself to become entangled too far in the net of the Franco-Russian policy; he no longer found the way out and he did not prevent the world-war—something that he could have done. Neither was the war popular with the English people; Belgium had to serve as a battlefield.

“Political marriages for life and death” are, as Prince Lichnowsky says, not possible in international unions. But neither is isolation, under the present condition of affairs in Europe. The history of Europe consists of coalitions that sometimes have led to the avoidance of warlike outbreaks and sometimes to violent clashes. A loosening

and dissolving of old alliances that no longer correspond to all conditions is only in order when new constellations are attainable. This was the object of the policy of a rapprochement with England. So long as this policy did not offer reliable guarantees we could not abandon the old guarantees—even with their obligations.

“WOUNDED SELF-LOVE”

The Morocco policy had led to a political defeat. In the Bosnian crisis this had been luckily avoided, the same as at the London Conference. A fresh diminution of our prestige was not endurable for our position in Europe and in the world. The prosperity of States, their political and economic successes, are based upon the prestige that they enjoy in the world.

The personal attacks contained in the work, the unheard-of calumnies and slanders of others condemn themselves. The ever-recurring suspicion that everything happened only because it was not desired to allow him, Lichnowsky, any successes, speaks of wounded self-love, of disappointed hopes for personal successes, and has a painful effect.

In closing, let us draw attention here to what Hermann Oncken has also quoted in his work, *The Old and New Central Europe*, the memorandum of Prince Bismarck of the year 1879, in which the idea is developed that the German Empire must never dare allow a situation in which it would

remain isolated on the European Continent between Russia and France, side by side with a defeated Austria-Hungary that had been left in the lurch by Germany.

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